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There is much international research on the different types of fraud committed by individuals and/or 
organised crime. There is, however, limited research on insurance fraud and a particular species of 
such fraud which has become known as ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud in the United Kingdom. In addition 
there are very few published studies of fraudsters which actually draw upon interviews with those 
that have committed the act(s). This paper bridges both of these gaps providing a focus upon ‘cash-
for-crash’ fraudsters which is based upon empirical research drawn from six interviews with such 
offenders and a database of over 400 offenders built upon successful prosecutions of such cases in 
the United Kingdom.  This paper offers a profile of such offenders and presents insights into why and 
how some people might become involved in ‘cash-for-crash’ type frauds.  
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Introduction  
In October 2015 the Sydney Morning Herald highlighted the case of a heavily pregnant woman who 
staged a motor accident to secure an insurance payment. In the same article the main trade body for 
insurers in Australia, the Insurance Council of Australia, was quoted as saying, ‘that networks of 
professional criminals had become "highly active" in the "claims farming" practice because it 
facilitates numerous payouts across multiple insurers’ (Duff, 2015). Insurance fraud and the 
involvement of a wide range of actors committing fraud, from lone opportunists to organised 
criminals, has been noted as a problem by several authors writing on Australia (see for example: 
Baldock, 1997; Hayes and Prenzler, 2003; Smith, 2015). In the UK over the last 10 years the type of 
fraud highlighted by the Sydney Morning Herald, which has been dubbed ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud, has 
grown to national prominence soliciting a wide range of government and industry initiatives  to 
address it (Button and Brooks,in-press).  
This paper explores ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud in the UK by providing a profile of the offenders who have 
been successfully prosecuted and then based upon interviews with six of those who have been 
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involved, offer insights on their motives for becoming involved. It will highlight the wide strata of 
society involved, from ‘ordinary’ citizens to large organised criminal networks. The paper starts with 
an examination of the types of ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud, before setting out the methodology for this 
research. The paper then examines the profile of those convicted for this type of crime, before 
examining some of the findings from the interviews which explain why people become involved in 
such crimes.   
Insurance Fraud 
There is a significant body of research that shows the willingness of ‘ordinary’ people to accept and 
engage in different types of insurance fraud in United Kingdom and other countries (Gill et al 1994; 
Dodd, 1998; Association of British Insurers, 2003; Hayes and Prenzler, 2003; Button et al, in Press; 
Karstedt and Farrall 2006; Buttler, 2013). There is also research illustrating the widespread 
involvement of the middle classes in the broad concept of white collar crime, into which much of 
fraud falls (Weisburd et al 1991; Weisburd and Waring 2001). There have, however, only been a 
limited number of studies on fraudsters in comparison to other criminals in the United Kingdom 
(Levi, 1998; Gill, 2005a; Goldstraw-White, 2011; Treadwell, 2011; Gill and Randall, 2015). Most have 
tended to focus upon relatively small scale samples in specific areas of fraud, seeking to understand 
their modus operandi and reasons for doing it. For example Levi’s (1998) study of plastic card fraud, 
Cressey (1953), Gill (2005b) and Goldstraw-White’s (2011) investigation of occupational fraudsters, 
and Dean and Melrose’s (1997) interviews with benefits fraudsters.  
 
Insurance fraud is a major problem, costing the United Kingdom sector over £1 billion per year 
(Association of British Insurers, 2012). ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud forms a significant part of this loss at 
£392 million per annum (Insurance Fraud Bureau, 2013). There has, however, been limited research 
on this type of fraud in the United Kingdom (see Clarke, 1989, 1990; Gill et al, 1994; Doig et al, 1999; 
Litton, 2000; Gill, 2001; Morley et al, 2006; Palasinski, 2009; Smith et al 2010; Dobie, 2012). There 
has been only one major study in the UK based upon interviews with insurance fraudsters, which will 
be returned to later in this paper (Gill and Randall, 2015). 
 
 ‘Cash-for-crash’ fraud is a form of insurance fraud based around a road traffic accident (real or fake) 
where those involved make fake or exaggerated claims about damage to the vehicle(s), and/or 
personal injury claims, amongst others. There are many variations on this type of fraud and these 
include:  
 A real accident where the claims are exaggerated;  
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 An accident where the fraudsters deliberately facilitate a situation so innocent motorists, 
who are likely to have insurance, crash into the back of them or both parties collude to 
create an accident which can then be used to farm claims;  
 A fake accident where vehicles are deliberately damaged to make it look like they have been 
involved in an accident and then claims are made or simply a fake claim is made with no 
damaged vehicle.   
The amount of money that can be made from one of these types of ‘accidents’ is between £3k and 
£30k, depending on the type of crash, the number(s) of people involved, what individuals claims for 
etc. There are a variety of income streams which enable this to occur: cash for damage to a car 
(value of car and damage can be exaggerated); personal injury claims for whiplash injuries for those 
‘in the vehicle’ (frequently for multiple persons in a car, whether they were there or not);  claims for 
loss of earnings; cost of hire cars (often corrupt hire car companies linked to scam, hire car may also 
be rehired unlawfully to name some); fees for accident management companies; fees for those 
recovering, storing or repairing the vehicle; fees for solicitors and fees for doctors.  
The extent of ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud was illustrated by an industry report by the Insurance Fraud 
Bureau (IFB) report in 2013, of which there is limited information on the methods used and so 
should be treated as an informed estimate, which estimated this type of fraud was worth £392 
million and that 1 in 7 personal injury claims were linked to ‘cash-for-crash’ scams, amounting to 
69,500 claims (Insurance Fraud Bureau, 2013). The report also noted 1 in 10 people would consider 
taking part in such a scam. Central to the ‘cash-for-crash’ scam is a personal injury claim which 
usually centres on what is commonly called ‘whiplash’. The House of Commons Transport 
Committee has conducted several inquiries into motor insurance and has touched upon the issue of 
fraud. It published some interesting statistics on the rise in personal injury claims set against the 
number of casualties on roads.  They showed while road casualties falling between 2005-10 from 
over 270,000 to just over 200,000, the number of motor insurance injury claims rose from just over 
466,000 to over 790,000 (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011). In other research 
published in 2013 by the Association of British Insurers they found the UK was the ‘whiplash’ capital 
of Europe. It found that 78 percent of personal injury claims following accidents are for whiplash. 
This compares to 30 percent in France and Denmark, 31 percent in Spain, 35 percent in the 
Netherlands and 68 percent in Italy (Association of British Insurers, 2013).  
‘Cash-for-crash’ fraud is therefore a major problem with thousands involved in it each year in the 
United Kingdom. Traditionally such claims have been dealt with by the insurance companies 
themselves by simply repudiating the claims. This still happens with most claims, but over the last 10 
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years or more the insurance industry has been ‘deepening’ its response to this problem by 
encouraging, facilitating and now paying for the police to investigate this type of fraud, amongst a 
number of other strategies (see Button and Brooks, in-press). Criminal prosecutions for insurance 
fraud and particularly this type, have therefore become much more common, although still 
representing the tip of the iceberg of the number of cases.  
Methods  
The principal aim of the research was to interview those who had been involved in ‘cash-for-crash’ 
fraud to understand their motivations, consideration of the strategies to prevent and detect them 
and their modus operandi, amongst others. The challenge, as with any research on criminals, is 
securing the participation of those involved. Most research on criminals and fraudsters has taken 
place in prisons (Gill, 2005a; Goldstraw-White, 2011; Maguire, 2012). The challenge in this research 
was that there have not been that many convicted of this type of crime. At the time of the research 
in 2011 the researchers had identified 189 convicted for this type of offence. Most of these were not 
sentenced to prison or for less than 12 months. Prison was therefore not likely to yield many 
potential participants.  
However, the insurance industry and police are very keen to promote successful prosecutions  for 
this type of fraud in the media as part of their deterrence strategy (see City of London Police, n,d,). 
Criminal prosecutions are rare by insurers and so when they are used they are keen for them to be 
publicised. As a consequence industry bodies and insurers often publish press releases and such 
cases often secure coverage in the media (national and local general, as well as trade press). The IFB  
(an industry funded body which undertakes various analytical functions to support investigations of 
insurance fraud) issues press releases for all cases it has an involvement in at various stages of the 
investigation process from arrest, charge, conviction and sentencing. All the convicted cases were 
added to the database related to cash-for-crash. The Insurance Fraud Investigators Group (a 
membership body of fraud investigators which shares intelligence) also profile on their websites 
cases from members and those highlighted in the media of arrests, convictions and sentences etc of 
insurance fraud cases. Those not already covered by the IFB were also added to the database. In 
both cases all insurance fraud cases are reported and so the researchers sifted out only ‘cash-for-
crash’ related cases. To further check that all reported cases were included in the database further 
media searchers were conducted which yielded a handful of minor cases which were not covered by 
the IFB/IFIG databases.   
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The authors are therefore confident for the time period considered (2008-2014) virtually all criminal 
convictions (including a very small number of contempt of court convictions ) for this type of offence 
are included in the database. This information would also often provide a variety of data, including 
name (and therefore gender in most cases), age, occupation as well as the last known address of the 
perpetrator (bar the number of the house). The researchers were able to use this publicly available 
information combined with  people tracing tools available on the internet (such as 192.com) to 
identify the complete last known addresses of many of the perpetrators. This also yielded a variety 
of other data on the fraudsters which has been subsequently updated to 2014 to yield a database of 
404 convicted ‘cash-for-crash’ fraudsters, which will be discussed shortly in this paper.  
The researchers were also supplied a database of 192 names from an insurance company that had 
fraudulently submitted claims which had been investigated and repudiated for fraud by that 
company, but which had not been pursued for criminal prosecution (which is the normal approach), 
of which 66 could be traced for an address (it was interesting that many of the claimants had not 
provided full or part of their home address and the researchers would only use such an address).  
This list proved a largely useless list yielding only one interviewee, who denied he was a fraudster. 
None of this data is included in the profile data later described, although details of the interviewee 
are noted later.  
In the second stage of the research the researchers sought to interview some of the fraudsters 
identified on the convicted list and the insurers list. Letters were written to those on the lists where 
an address had been given or traced inviting them for interview and marked ‘personal and 
confidential’ with an incentive of a £50 token for participation. This amounts to the ‘cold’ contacting 
of potential research participants, which is undertaken extensively and widely in social research.  
The researchers also drew on their network of contacts in law enforcement, insurance companies 
and friends for anyone who might have been convicted or involved in such frauds. From the 
convicted list the research team secured 3 responses, the insurers list 1 (who also disputed he had 
submitted a fraudulent claim), 1 through a law enforcement agency, and 1 through one of the 
research teams network of friends.  Six interviews might initially seem a small sample, but Gill (2005) 
found such an approach to secure fraud interviewees very difficult. Gill and Randall (2015) also 
found it difficult to secure interviews with the much wider potential of all potential insurance 
fraudsters, illustrating the challenges of interviewing such persons in the field. Nevertheless, as Gray 
(2013) has shown with the offence of corruption, useful findings can be drawn from a very small 
sample, as he was able to secure significant findings from a ‘public interview’ with only one offender.  
Another important question relates to how representative of this type of fraudsters the six are, given 
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the vast majority declined to be involved. However, as will be shown shortly, at least in terms of 
profile the group are representative of those who have been convicted of this type of fraud to date.  
Of the six interviews, five took place over the telephone and five were recorded. The reason for the 
use of telephone interview was because of safety. The researchers had been alerted by law 
enforcement that some of those convicted may have links with Islamic extremists and/or organised 
crime and it would be dangerous to approach them. There have been studies that have interviewed 
active fraudsters in the field who have not been detected by law enforcement (a form of research 
which is increasingly difficult to secure approval from ethics committees), such as Treadwell’s (2011) 
study of fraudsters selling counterfeit goods on E-Bay. However, he had a gatekeeper and had not 
been warned of potential risks to his safety. The researchers for this paper had been warned and the 
university health and safety procedures meant most of the interviews had to take place using the 
telephone.  
Profile of ‘cash-for-crash’ fraudsters  
The analysis of the press releases and media coverage of ‘cash-for-crash’ fraudsters provided a wide 
range of data about those who have been convicted for this type of fraud. The interest of the media 
in such cases and the desire of the insurance and law enforcement industry to raise the profile of the 
detection and punishment of this type of offence mean the researchers are confident that they have 
secured the vast majority of convictions that have taken place for this crime in the United Kingdom. 
There might be some minor cases which have not been publicised or reported. Some cases also do 
not offer all details, such as age or because of the name it is not possible to determine the gender of 
a person. The database, however, represents the largest assessment to date of the profile of this 
type of insurance fraudster.   
Profile of a convicted ‘cash-for-crash’ fraudster 
Building profiles of fraudsters is fraught with challenges (Hayes and Prenzler, 2003). The profile 
about to be revealed is built upon convictions, which reflect what insurers and the police decide to 
detect and prosecute. It should be considered, therefore, as a profile of convicted ‘cash-for-crash’ 
fraudsters, rather than all ‘cash-for-crash’ fraudsters. Table 1 sets out the profile of a convicted 
‘cash-for-crash’ fraudster. It shows the dominance of men at 84.4 percent of convictions. The 
dominance of men has also been noted in profiles of occupational fraudsters (Bussman and Werle, 
2006; KPMG, 2011). It is, however, different from the much more balanced gender profile found by 
Button et al (In Press) of household insurance fraudsters. The mean and median age were 35.5 and 
33 respectively, with just short of three quarters of those convicted under the age of 40. This 
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indicates this type of fraud is a younger persons type of crime, compared to occupational fraud and 
household insurance fraud, where the mean and median ages tends to be in the 40s and above 
(Bussman and Werle, 2006; KPMG, 2011; Button et al, In Press).   
Table 1 about here 
Many of the reports offered indications of the status, occupation and lifestyle of those convicted of 
these types of offences. They included the ‘usual suspects’ of ‘known’ organised criminals who were 
using this type of crime as an additional income source alongside other criminal enterprises. For 
example in March 2013 the trial process ended for a total of 60 people from County Durham 
associated to a notorious crime family, the ‘Wrights’ of Burnhope, who were linked to over 250 
suspicious accidents and convicted for over half a million pounds of fraud (The Guardian, 2013).  
There were also, however, a variety of other groups, not as commonly associated with criminal 
enterprise. In the early convictions for this type of crime there were a number of Asian groups 
centred round extended families and associates/friends from locations where they lived, who were 
convicted. For example in 2009 Mohamed Patel was convicted for his part in large ‘cash-for-crash’ 
scam for which he was implicated in at least 93 car crashes costing insurers £17,000 each on 
average. Over 20 others were convicted in association with this group, with most linked by family 
and locality (Greater Manchester) (BBC News, 2009; Insurance Fraud Bureau, 2009). A further 
dimension is that groups of men and women linked by a common workplace. For example in 2010 a 
group of 25 were convicted for involvement in a ‘cash-for-crash’ scam, mostly recruited by Darren 
Duvall at the NTL Birkenhead office where they worked (Liverpool Echo, 2010). There have also been 
relatively small groups of friends and family who have been convicted. For example a brother and his 
step-sister from Barry in Wales were convicted in 2014 for staging a crash between a hired van and 
car and making up whiplash claims (Barry and District News, 2014).  Single opportunists have also 
been sanctioned for exploiting genuine crashes, such as Joanne Kirk who was found guilty of 
Contempt of Court related to an exaggerated personal injury claim for a rear end shunt she had 
experienced and received £25,000 compensation for (Guildhall Chambers, n.d).  
The other notable observation from the wide range of individuals that have been convicted (where 
this is noted in the report in the media – which it isn’t always) has been the involvement of those 
from a wide strata of society. For example a TV Producer, civil servant, salesmen, a surveyor, a 
butcher, a university administrator, council workers, claims managers, bus drivers, taxi drivers, 
company directors, asylum seekers, pensioners, young mothers to the unemployed have all been 
convicted for involvement in this type of scam. Those working in businesses servicing the motor 
accident industry such as garage repair, accident management and car hire businesses have also 
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featured many times amongst those convicted.  The means to exploit crashes for financial bonus 
have become common knowledge amongst the general population as was illustrated to the authors 
while conducting this research, when one of them suffered a rear end shunt. His car was replaced 
with a hire car while being repaired and when visiting friends (who as far as the author is aware are 
not convicted criminals or engaged in criminal activity), one of them noted the hire car, to which the 
reasons were explained, to which she retorted in a humorous tone, ‘Got a sore neck, eh? £3 grand 
for your holiday coming your way!’ (the author concerned did not have whiplash and so didn’t make 
a claim). 
The researchers were also able to assess the last known address of a significant number of the 
fraudsters in the database. This is presented in Table 2 below and has been broken down into the  
nations of the United Kingdom and English regions. The data is compared to the percentage of the 
UK population by area. This shows some striking findings. First there were no fraudsters with last 
known addresses in Scotland or Northern Ireland. Further probing of key individuals in the sector led 
to the revelation that the system for reimbursing lawyers in Scotland and Northern Ireland in their 
view did not encourage claims vis-à-vis England and Wales where the system did ie ‘no-win-no-fee’ is 
common. Second, there were regions of England which were significantly over-represented. For 
example the North West accounted for 38.8 percent of prosecutions, but accounts for only 11.1 
percent of the population. At the other extreme the South West accounted for only 0.7 percent of 
prosecutions, but accounts for 8.4 percent of the population. There are a number of factors which 
could explain these differences. First it could arise from the interest of the local police forces. If this 
is so the areas of high prosecution would represent areas where there is interest amongst the police 
in this crime and areas with little or no fraudsters would represent areas where there is little interest 
from the police. However, as has been noted already and will be developed later in this paper, 
networks through family, friends, work colleagues etc are very important in these crimes. Areas 
where such criminal enterprises have been established may lead to knowledge sharing and the 
furtherance of the crime. Nevertheless the significant differences between the regions is clearly an 
area which warrants further research.  
Table 2 about here 
 
Profile of interviewees  
The interviewees’ roles in ‘cash-for-cash’ fraud and what happened to them is set out in Table 3. It 
shows they were all minor operatives and not ringleaders. The researchers did write to the convicted 
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organisers where contact details were traced but unfortunately none would participate. 
Nevertheless as the latter part of the paper will show, even though most were minor players they 
did offer interesting insights on this crime and the organisation of it. It is also important to note that 
such minor players represent the vast majority of those who are convicted.  
Table 3 about here.  
Table 4 also provides a profile of those that were interviewed. The group were representative of the 
broader group who have been convicted as presented in table 1 with a dominance of men and those 
under 40. There is also  a dominance of the North West with 4 of the six coming from that area, 
which the profile of those convicted also showed. None of the interviewees were part of the same 
gang.   
Table 4 about here.  
As the interviewees were happy to take part in the research, when the vast majority were not, this 
may make them unusual in the context of the broader population of this type of fraudster. In the 
absence, however, of much research in this area this should be treated as the first research on ‘cash-
for-crash’ fraudsters. Securing interviews with what many would call as white collar type criminals in 
the field is ultimately difficult (Gill and Randall, 2015), although as noted earlier Gray’s (2013) work 
on corruption reveals useful insights can be secured even if only one offender is assessed.   
Understanding involvement in ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud 
 
The explanations for the causes and occurrence of fraud are found in the interaction of individual 
and social structures, and have been examined from a variety of perspectives such as public choice 
where the individual is portrayed as a rational calculated person (Clarke and Cornish, 1985) who 
chooses fraud when the advantages of such an act outweigh its expected disadvantages (Rose-
Ackerman, 1978; Klitgaard, 1988; Graaf, 2007) and the idea of a rogue element and/or the ‘bad 
apple’ where the cause of fraud  is within an individual under pressure (Cressey, 1973). In much of 
the literature individualist explanations seek to discover the underlying characteristics and 
motivations of the offenders. However, an alternative approach is to stress how similar rather than 
different people are who commit different types of fraud (Coleman, 1999). Rather than review all 
literature here, however, we focus on key theoretical explanations as to why people commit ‘cash-




This research discovered that ‘cash-for-crash’ is often seen as providing a simple opportunity to 
secure additional payment, with the variety acts that fall under ‘cash-for crash’ viewed as harmless 
or at worse borderline criminality. Combined with these recurring views in this research was the 
perception that the risk of arrest and then conviction was low and that the police were not 
interested in this type of crime and the insurance industry lack the skills to detect offenders. As one 
of the participants noted: 
 
 You can put it down to people taking a chance and putting a good display on and 
thinking they will get away with it. You know the insurance companies are only as good 
as the people they employ to process and look into these cases. Guy.  
The fraud triangle (Cressey, 1973) of ‘pressure’, ‘opportunity’ and ‘rationalisation’ offers some 
explanatory value, particularly that of rationalisation. However, none of those we interviewed 
seemed to be under ‘un-shareable’ stress or strain (Agnew, 1985) - perceived or actual – involved in 
a collapse or downturn of business, mounting debts and lack of recognition with an organisation and 
relationship with employers. This fraud triangle is mostly applicable to those on the inside of an 
organisation. Furthermore, it is wide ranging and perhaps an all-encompassing catalogue of factors. 
Personal pressure can manifest itself in many ways; financial, psychological and social and as a result 
of pressure, opportunity and rationalisation, the culture of environment and/or matters of personal 
life (Gill, 2005), all of which suggested that people will commit fraud.  Albrecht et al (1984) also 
present the acts of fraud as built on pressure, opportunity and rationalisation and included factors 
such as living beyond personal income, a desire for personal progression, high personal debt, 
pressure from family and friends.  These factors are also wide-ranging and too broad, particularly if 
pressure is perceived rather than real and therefore all of us, at some point in time, could fit into 
some of these explanatory factors. Furthermore, some of these are instrumental factors while 
others are expressive and emotional. It is difficult to know when, or if what factors are responsible 
for acts of fraud, as they are multi-layered and complex (Brooks et al, 2013). In the cases of cash–for-
crash, however, it is this last ‘factor’ of pressure from family and friends that played a part in some 
people’s involvement in ‘cash-for crash’.  
 
It was actually a cousin of mine whose actually car was being hit, and he actually rang 
me up, saying to me, ‘Oh can you come down and…can you come to Manchester, and I’ll 
put you as the person in the car, and I’ll give you so much money out of it.’  And that was 




Furthermore, justifications and in particular techniques of neutralisation (Sykes and Matza, 1957) 
and Dittenhofer, 1995) were recurring themes in this research.  Many did not even consider what 
they were doing to be criminal. As stated:  
 
I did not do anything wrong. I just inflated the claim/damage. He was successful. He 
paid me anyway for using my name as a witness (to his claim). Stuart.    
Just a passenger in a car and I didn’t really…well I didn’t know what was going to 
happen, I didn’t know how it was going to happen at the time…nothing…it was just 
offered to me and I didn’t have a job or nothing.  And I was struggling for a bit of money.  
So I didn’t actually think what was going to happen.  I didn’t think obviously it was going 
to be…I didn’t think we were going to get arrested or anything like that at the time.  I 
got offered a bit of money, and all I actually had to do was to sit in the car.  So I wasn’t 
driving or nothing, I was just sitting as a passenger in a car. Zahir.  
In this instance it is possible to see Zahir as both an offender and victim of fraud (Button, Pakes and 
Blackbourn, In Press; Pratt, Holtfreter and Reisig, 2007; Hutchins and Hayes, 2008) due to his limited 
knowledge of what he was involved with.  
 
A common theme to this research, however, was the denial of the victim (Sykes and Matza, 1957, 
Matza, 1964). In many variations of the scam there is no crash and the insurance company as the 
victim is rationalised as a deserving one. As Palasinski (2009, p. 552) has noted such an attitude is 
common regarding the insurance industry viewed as unscrupulous and evil. This fitted with Stuart 
that saw his insurance company as a malign organisation which had failed to pay out on previous 
‘genuine’ insurance claims, so deserved the false one. As he noted:  
 
I made the claim because Insurance companies make money out of us. They do all they 
can to stop paying you and even if you don’t have an accident put up the insurance… 
Insurance companies are a con. I have always paid my insurance and yet when I want 
them they are awkward and do all they can do is block paying you. Stuart.  
This perceived injustice, also referred to as the ‘due me’ fraud has resonance with previous research. 
Mars (1982; 1984) and Hollinger and Clark (1983) in particular have pointed out that the ‘due me’ 
frauds are usually small and primarily used to fulfil a lack of financial reward. Whilst these papers 
were concerned with employees in an organisation, particularly those that have spent years at the 
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same company, where a personal contribution to the company has not been amply recognised the 
sense of injustice and ‘due me’ payment is common to both.   
 
In this research, we further uncovered workplace collaboration to defraud an insurance company. 
The work of Ditton (1977) and Mars (1982) has resonance here as they illustrated how colleagues 
are prepared to collaborate or assist a friend to defraud either employers or and customers. In this 
research Guy noted his involvement had been facilitated by a colleague who he noted:  
 
Well we worked together in the van….  
I lent them my work vehicle like and knew they were going to use it to create a fake 
crash and all that. I knew they were going to smash it up but I don’t know actually what 
happened or where they did it. We all agreed that I would provide the vehicle and they 
would organise everything else. I don’t know what happened with the other vehicle of 
the other people who claimed for the injuries. I told the people at work that I had a 
crash. Guy.  
For Stuart the scam was not an industrial scale enterprise and responded to a friend who was 
seeking help. As he stated:  
 
A friend/mate asked me to be a witness to a car accident that he was in.  He used my 
name. He told me that he had been in an accident with an old person and he was to 
blame, but the old person was ‘shaken-up’ and he used this to his advantage. Stuart.     
Extracts from the interviews further illustrate a rationalisation of this unsolicited opportunity and 
planned organised insurance fraud: 
  
…when my cousin called me …we just thought, ‘It’s alright, it’s only a bit of money, we’ll 
just go for it.’  Zahir. 
 
One day; I received an email, pointing out that I could earn 1-2k / month by just working 
3-4 hours per week. On replying back to the advert I was contacted by the scam team 
and asked to send a recent size photo of myself and a brief CV. On sending the requested 
information I was given a call by one of the team members, I was given time to meet up 




When Razi met the fraudsters was very impressed with signs of material wealth. As he recounted:  
The gang leader came driving a Range Rover Sports and was wearing very Dapo  (new 
and stylish) clothes…  I told him I need to think about this, on hearing this he was not 
impressed and said there is a job for you tomorrow morning if you want to be earning 
this lifestyle then email me by the end of today. Once our meeting was ended he 
dropped me near my house. I was fascinated by his lifestyle and his style of clothing – he 
told me how he is able to look after his family but also got a very healthy lifestyle. Razi. 
Zahir and Razi were both in cars that deliberately crashed. For Zahir no preparation or instruction 
was offered. For Razi, however, it was treated like any ‘ordinary’ position of employment and 
induction into a company.  Razi, was briefed and trained for the task ahead. As he explained:    
 
Once I agreed to be part of the scam, I was called by the Gang Leader and was asked to 
come to the location in the morning.  At the location ( garage) I was shown on a white 
chart how the scam would be carried out. There I met the driver and some other 
passenger of other cars. Once we were shown the process of the scam we were shown a 
slight demo with cars as well. After this I was asked to confirm whether I understood 
everything – I was a bit worried about the impact of the crash but I was shown through 
the car demo that it won’t be much of the impact. Razi.  
How many hours did you take? I.  
2-3 hours were training and then it took us one hour to commit the crime. Razi.  
 
This organised approach to ‘cash-for-crash’ has been noted by police in the United Kingdom. Button 
and Brooks (in press) found one police officer interviewed stated that they were ‘keeping one 
particular group of criminal’s under-surveillance’ as they ‘noticed them deliberately destroying a 
vehicle’. This type of crime, however, is only one in an armoury of professional and organised 
criminal ventures, as illustrated by Hobbs in his trilogy of works on the criminal working classes of 
the East End of London (Hobbs, 1988, 1995 and 2013).  
 
There are elements of rational choice (Clarke and Cornish, 1985) and routines (Cohen and Felson, 
1979) in the responses from our participants in ‘cash-for-crash’, but cultural, familial and community 
relationships were always part of the explanation and justification for involvement in this type of 
14 
 
crime. As such, individuals’ morality can be seen as of less importance that the environment in which 
a person is located (Boisjoly, 1995) that directs human action and interaction. Sutherland’s (1948, 
1949) suggestion that crime is explained by a preponderance of criminal attitudes instead of non-
criminal attitudes and socialised into such attitudes has some relevance to ‘cash-for-crash’ and the 
techniques of neutralisation mentioned above. However, this association fails to explain how and 
why people do not engage in systematic fraud and reject the offer to engage in crime that Razi and 
others were unable to. In fact, Braithwaite (1985) denounced differential association as a 
platitudinous attempt to explain organisational crime in particular (Brooks et al, 2013) and of limited 
value.  
 
All of these explanations are of course limited; however, they do offer us with a working framework 
to understand why people commit ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud. The extent to which a culture and personal 
and familial relationships determines involvement in this crime, however, is dependent on a number 
of factors. Those that organised ‘cash-for-crash’ scams ensured, as much as they possible could, 
those approached could be trusted. The scams suited ‘groups’ who have common bonds and 
cultures. Many of the convictions for ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud have centred on the Asian community 
(from the Indian sub-continent) in the United Kingdom. These scams were planned, organised and 
executed by extended families and close knit communal links. Analysis of those convicted reveals 
many husbands and wives, partners, sons and daughters, cousins and extended family members 
involved in this type of fraud. The community and its values and contacts in particular influenced the 
young men involved in this crime. 
 
I knew people who had given cars and gone ahead with this fraud that was going on 
with the slam-ons, or there was fraud, rather than doing slam-ons, people were just 
getting in their cars, finding other people who had a clean profile, like never had an 
accident before, never claimed before, in a good profession, one of them would be 
learner drivers, getting one of them to do a 'fault accident' basically…it was just people 
that I knew growing up in the area, and I knew about these lads. Around every single 
corner in Bolton there's an accident management company. Now, I just knew these 
people, because I've grown up with them and I knew what they were doing and what 





Even though acts of fraud are often secretive, and thus difficult to define and classify there have still 
been attempts to construct a profile of characteristics and behaviour that might help identify 
potential individuals. However, the theoretical and empirical literature we have drawn on has its 
limitations, too. This is not to dismiss it, but merely recognise that we are still building on the useful 
and informative work undertaken to date.  The search to understand why people commit ‘cash-for-
crash’ fraud in certain circumstances is ongoing, but research is also needed in keeping checks and 
balances in place to prevent and reduce the incidence of this crime in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere that encounter this type of fraud.   
 
Conclusion  
This paper has illustrated the growing problem  of ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud in the United Kingdom, 
which is presently estimated at £392 million per annum (Insurance Fraud Bureau, 2013). Only a tiny 
percentage of those involved have been pursued in the criminal courts, with many undetected or 
dealt with by the insurance companies through denial of their claims. However, the small number 
who have been successfully pursued highlight a wide strata of society involved, from organised 
criminals to families to opportunistic individuals with a diverse range of occupations from the 
highest to the lowest in society. If those convicted are typical of all those involved this research 
supports findings from other studies in general insurance fraud  and other white collar crime 
illustrating widespread involvement in criminal activity of ordinary people (Wiesburd et al, 1991; 
Karstedt and Farrall, 2006). The paper highlighted innovative methods to trace the fraudsters and 
interview them outside of a prison context. The small number of interviews   yielded important 
findings on how and why  ‘cash-for-crash’ fraud is committed and the motivation of offenders and 
limited interest criminology has so far paid to this crime. This paper is, hoped, to provide a platform 
on which to build further research into this and other types of fraud.  
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Tables  
Table 1. The profile of a ‘cash-for-cash’ convicted fraudster (2008-2014) 
Characteristic 
 
Number  Percentage 
of Known 
Gender   
Male  335 84.4 
Female 62 15.6 
Unknown  6  
Age   
Under 30 104 31.2 
30 to 39 139 41.7 
40-49 55 16.5 
50-59 21 6.3 
60+ 13 3.9 
Unknown  71  
Mean Age 35.5  
Standard Deviation  9.9  
Median Age  33  





Table 2. Last known address by region of convicted ‘cash-for-crash’ fraudster (2008-2014) 
 % of 
Prosecutions 
% of UK 
Population 
East Midlands 2.2 7.2 
East of England 17.2 9.3 
London 16.8 13.0 
North East  3.4 4.1 
North West 38.8 11.1 
South East 4.1 13.7 
South West 0.7 8.4 
Wales 1.9 4.8 




Scotland 0.0 8.3 
Northern Ireland 0.0 2.9 
N=268 
Note: 
1 The researchers secured the population of the regions from (ONS, 2015) and then where a last 
known address of an offender was identified it was linked to a region. The researchers were then 




Table 3. Fraudsters and suspected fraudsters interviewed 
 









Worked for a company where there were 
a number of fraudulent claims made and 
he was asked to become involved for a 
payment. His involvement was supplying 
his work van to be smashed.  
He was caught amongst many 
others and sentenced to 6 
months imprisonment. He also 
lost his job and at the time of 
interview was out of work.  
Zahir 
 
Was contacted by a cousin to see if he 
wanted to make some ‘easy’ money for 
sitting in a car. He was given a thousand 
pounds. He met his cousin and another 
person and sat in the car while the driver 
He was caught as part of a 
wider investigation into a 
conspiracy to defraud and 








Was well versed in the culture of 
fraudulent claims in his community and 
also had prior convictions for fraud and 
decided he wanted a new car and knew 
people who could help arrange a crash of 
his old car in-order to realise this.  
He was caught as part of a 
wider investigation into a 
conspiracy to defraud and was 
sentenced to 8 months 
imprisonment. He was already 
serving a 3 year sentence for 




Stuart was paid to be a witness for a friend 
for an accident he wasn’t present at and 
had previously submitted an exaggerated 
claim for a motor accident.  
  
He received the payment for 
being a witness and the 
insurance payout and has not 
been caught by the insurance 
company or the police.  
Razi 
 
Razi was unemployed and received an E-
Mail promising £1k to £2k income per 
month for only a few hours work. He sat in 
a car which was deliberately crashed.  
He received a payment but was 
caught a few months later and 
was ultimately convicted of 
conspiracy to defraud and was 




Dave worked for a firm of solicitors dealing 
with personal injury claims. After an 
accident where a car crashed into the back 
of him he submitted a personal injury 
claim. After initially been treated as 
legitimate, he was then treated as a 
fraudster after the car had been inspected.  
Dave sued the insurance 
company and won. It is unlikely 
he was a fraudster, but it is 
interesting that the insurance 





















Gender M M M M M M 
Age  31-40 21-30 21-30 31-40 21-30 41-50 
Race White Asian  Asian White Asian White 
Region North West North West North West East 
Midlands 
North West South East 
Occupation 
at time of 
fraud/claim 
Sales Unemployed Banking Call centre 
operative 
Unemployed Legal clerk 



















Family Single Single Living with 
partner 
Single Married 
 
 
